But she does — because some blood is green and Aaron says so. There then begins a magical flit around the world using pixie dust that she just kind of accepts and takes in her stride.
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This goes on for a long time before Beckit asks any real questions about what is happening in her life — and she never really expresses doubt or disbelief. Good question - one that is never asked. But from then on Beckit and the narrative constantly refer to him as an erone without ever defining the term.
This happens a lot — she repeatedly accepts their language and labels without question or definition. So frustrating. But on top of all that we have endless descriptions about how much of an Adonis Aaron is with his blessedly perfect sexiness — even when one of her loved ones is bleeding on the carpet. A large number of the side characters are also POC, including the monarchs and the prince who was being set up as a major character.
I have a few problems with his character, though. Firstly, he kind of just joins the group. He has no real compelling need to, certainly no reason to take on nightmares and risk his life for them — but he does. He felt like a gross addition to the plot, he was almost pushed into the group that he had no real reason to be in and then added very little beyond the odd sassiness. Walter Christie , the Soviets produced 5, armoured vehicles by This wealth of equipment enabled the Red Army to create tank organizations for both infantry support and combined arms, mechanized operations.
On 12 June , the Soviet government executed Tukhachevsky and eight of his high-ranking officers, as Stalin shifted his purge of Soviet society against the last power group that had the potential to threaten him, the Red Army. The Soviet tanks were too lightly armoured, their Russian crews could not communicate with the Spanish troops, and in combat the tanks tended to outpace the supporting infantry and artillery.
The United States was not nearly so advanced in the development of armoured and mechanized forces. As in France, the supply of slow World War I tanks and the subordination of tanks to the infantry branch impeded the development of any role other than direct infantry support. The US War Department policy statement, which finally came in April , was a serious blow to tank development.
Reflecting prevailing opinion, it stated that the tank's primary mission was "to facilitate the uninterrupted advance of the riflemen in the attack. The light tank was to be truck transportable and not exceed 5 tons gross weight. For the medium, restrictions were even more stringent; its weight was not to exceed 15 tons, so as to bring it within the weight capacity of railroad flatcars, the average existing highway bridge, and, most significantly, available Engineer Corps pontoon bridges. Although an experimental ton tank, the M, reached the mock-up stage, this and other attempts to satisfy War Department and infantry specifications proved to be unsatisfactory.
In reality it was simply impossible to build a ton vehicle meeting both War Department and infantry requirements. In the General Staff reluctantly consented to the development of a ton tank, although it made clear that efforts were to continue toward the production of a satisfactory ton vehicle. The infantry—its new branch chief overriding the protests of some of his tankmen who wanted a more heavily armed and armored medium—decided, too, that a light tank, transportable by truck, best met infantry requirements.
The net effect of the infantry's preoccupation with light tanks and the limited funds available for tank development in general was to slow the development of heavier vehicles and, ultimately, to contribute to the serious shortage of mediums at the outbreak of World War II. Walter Christie was an innovative designer of tanks, engines and propulsion systems.
Although his designs did not meet US Army specifications, other countries used his chassis patents. Despite inadequate funding, the Ordnance Department managed to develop several experimental light and medium tanks and tested one of Walter Christie's models by None of these tanks was accepted, usually because each of them exceeded standards set by other Army branches. For instance, several light tank models were rejected because they exceeded the 5-ton cargo capacity of the Transportation Corps trucks, and several medium tank designs were rejected because they exceeded the ton bridge weight limit set by the engineers.
Christie simply would not work with users to fulfill the military requirements but, instead, wanted the Army to fund the tanks that he wanted to build. Patton later worked closely with J. Walter Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and weapons of tanks. The Christie tank embodied the ability to operate both on tracks and on large, solid-rubber-tired bogie wheels. The tracks were removable to permit operation on wheels over moderate terrain. Also featured was a suspension system of independently sprung wheels.
The Christie had many advantages, including the amazing ability, in , to attain speeds of 69 miles per hour on wheels and 42 miles per hour on tracks, although at these speeds the tank could not carry full equipment. To the infantry and cavalry the Christie was the best answer to their need for a fast, lightweight tank, and they were enthusiastic about its convertibility.
Armored (The Té-trad Tale, Book 1) by M. A. Wilder
On the other hand, the Ordnance Department, while recognizing the usefulness of the Christie, was of the opinion that it was mechanically unreliable and that such dual-purpose equipment generally violated good engineering practice. The controversy over the advantages and drawbacks of Christie tanks raged for more than twenty years, with the convertible principle being abandoned in But the Christie ideas had great impact upon tank tactics and unit organization in many countries and, finally, upon the US Army as well.
In the United States the real beginning of the Armored Force was in , twelve years before it was officially established, when Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis directed that a tank force be developed in the Army. Earlier that year he had been much impressed, as an observer of maneuvers in England, by a British experimental armoured Force. Actually the idea was not new. A small group of dedicated officers in the cavalry and the infantry had been hard at work since World War I on theories for such a force.
The continued progress in the design of armour, armament, engines, and vehicles was gradually swinging the trend toward more mechanization, and the military value of the horse declined. Proponents of mechanization and motorization pointed to advances in the motor vehicle industry and to the corresponding decrease in the use of horses and mules. Furthermore, abundant oil resources gave the United States an enviable position of independence in fuel requirements for the machines. Secretary Davis' directive for the development of a tank force resulted in the assembly and encampment of an experimental mechanized force at Camp Meade , Maryland, from 1 July to 20 September An effort to continue the experiment in was defeated by insufficient funds and obsolete equipment, but the exercise did bear fruit, for the War Department Mechanization Board, appointed to study results of the experiment, recommended the permanent establishment of a mechanized force.
As Chief of Staff from to , Douglas MacArthur wanted to advance motorization and mechanization throughout the army. In late all arms and services were directed to adopt mechanization and motorization, "as far as is practicable and desirable", and were permitted to conduct research and to experiment as necessary. Cavalry was given the task of developing combat vehicles that would "enhance its power in roles of reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, flank action, pursuit, and similar operations.
In MacArthur set the stage for the coming complete mechanization of the cavalry, declaring, "The horse has no higher degree of mobility today than he had a thousand years ago. The time has therefore arrived when the Cavalry arm must either replace or assist the horse as a means of transportation, or else pass into the limbo of discarded military formations. The War Department in modified its directive for all arms and services to adopt mechanization and motorization. Thereafter, development of mechanization was to be accomplished by two of the combat arms only—the cavalry and the infantry.
As late as , on the other hand, the Chief of Cavalry, Maj. John K. Herr , proclaimed, "We must not be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse.
In testimony before a Congressional committee in , Maj. Herr maintained that horse cavalry had "stood the acid test of war", whereas the motor elements advocated by some to replace it had not. Actually, between the world wars there was much theoretical but little tangible progress in tank production and tank tactics in the United States.
Production was limited to a few hand-tooled test models, only thirty-five of which were built between and Regarding the use of tanks with infantry, the official doctrine of largely reiterated that of It maintained that "As a rule, tanks are employed to assist the advance of infantry foot troops, either preceding or accompanying the infantry assault echelon. In the s the American Army began to seriously discuss the integration of the tank and the airplane into existing doctrine, but the US Army remained an infantry-centered Army, even though sufficient changes had occurred to warrant serious study.
In the spring of , maneuvers in Georgia and Louisiana, where Patton was an umpire, showed how far U. Army General Adna R. Chaffee Jr.
World War II forced armies to integrate all the available arms at every level into a mobile, flexible team. The mechanized combined arms force came of age in this war. In , most armies still thought of an armoured division as a mass of tanks with relatively limited support from the other arms.
By , the same armies had evolved armoured divisions that were a balance of different arms and services, each of which had to be as mobile and almost as protected as the tanks they accompanied.
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This concentration of mechanized forces in a small number of mobile divisions left the ordinary infantry unit deficient in armour to accompany the deliberate attack. The German, Soviet, and American armies therefore developed a number of tank surrogates such as tank destroyers and assault guns to perform these functions in cooperation with the infantry. Armour experts in most armies, however, were determined to avoid being tied to the infantry, and in any event a tank was an extremely complicated, expensive, and therefore scarce weapon.
The British persisted for much of the war on a dual track of development, retaining Infantry tanks to support the infantry and lighter, more mobile cruiser tanks for independent armoured formations. The Soviets similarly produced an entire series of heavy breakthrough tanks. During the war, German tank design went through at least three generations, plus constant minor variations.
The first generation included such prewar vehicles as the Panzerkampfwagen or Panzer I and II, which were similar to Soviet and British light tanks. However, the appearance of large numbers of the new generation T and KV-1 Soviet tanks, that were unknown to Germans until , compelled them to join a race for superior armour and gun power.
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The third generation included many different variants, but the most important designs were the Panther Panzer V and Tiger Panzer VI tanks. Unfortunately for the Germans, lack of resources combined with emphasis on protection and firepower and a penchant for overly complex design philosophies in nearly every part of an armoured fighting vehicle's design compromised the production numbers. The alternative to constant changes in tank design was to standardize a few basic designs and mass-produce them even though technology had advanced to new improvements.
This was the solution of Germany's principal opponents. The Soviet T, for example, was an excellent basic design that survived the war with only one major change in armament, The United States had even more reason to standardize and mass-produce than did the Soviet Union. By concentrating on mechanical reliability, the US was able to produce vehicles that operated longer with fewer repair parts.
To ensure that American tanks were compatible with American bridging equipment, the War Department restricted tank width and maximum weight to thirty tons. The army relaxed these requirements only in late When Germany invaded western Europe in , the US Army had only 28 new tanks — 18 medium and 10 light — and these were soon to become obsolete, along with some older models on hand.
The Army had no heavy tanks and no immediate plans for any. Even more serious than the shortage of tanks was industry's lack of experience in tank manufacture and limited production facilities. Furthermore, the United States was committed to helping supply its allies.